Has the Law Made Liars of Us All?

By Don R. Castleman, Professor of Law, Wake Forest University Law School
Q: How can you tell when a lawyer is lying?
A:

Easy. See if his lips are moving.
(Old lawyer joke - Source unknown)

The premise of this article is that (a) the law, both substantive and procedural often
demonstrates little regard for the truth, (b) the legal profession has largely ceased to hold truth
and honesty as core values, as demonstrated by the Model Rules of Professional Conduct as well
as by professional practices, (c) over the past two decades, the law, lawyers and the courts have
been highly publicized by the media thus exposing society to these shortcomings, and (d) the
result has been that society has come to blur the difference between honesty and legality and this
may have contributed to the many corporate fiascos of recent years involving companies such as
Enron, Imclone, Global Crossing, etc., etc. This article will examine various aspects of criminal
and civil law, rules of evidence, cases involving the lawyer-client relationship and the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, to demonstrate the initial premise and will conclude with a
discussion of possible corrections or improvements. The article is written with no illusions that
it will be well received, but with the realization that many, perhaps most, will condemn its
premises as mere moralizing and will dismiss the conclusions and suggestions as naive. In fact,
one noteworthy commentator would summarily reject the premise, having made the following
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rather startling assertion: “Good lawyers sometimes lie. I said,’a lawyer who says he never lies is
either not a good lawyer or is lying.’” [ FN 1 ]
In their insightful little book, The Moral Compass of the American Lawyer, [FN2]
Richard Zitrin and Carol M. Langford present an illustration of litigation involving a lowly paid
nurse’s aide who was fired from the health care facility where she had worked because she had
expressed her concern to her employer about improper and poor cleanliness practices in the
facility. [FN3] When she brought an action for improper discharge, the attorney associate at the
large firm which represented the health care facility devised a “clever” procedural defense. She
scheduled a discovery deposition of the plaintiff at one of the firm’s outlying offices which
would require the plaintiff, unemployed and without resources, to take a train to the city center
and then one bus and a transfer to another bus to reach the outlying location, a time-consuming
and costly trip. (When, in fact, the associate’s own office was conveniently located at the city
center, accessible by a short train trip for the plaintiff.) Although the plaintiff pleaded by
telephone for a change in the location, the attorney politely refused and when the plaintiff was
unable to keep the appointment, the attorney filed a motion for dismissal and the lawsuit was
thwarted. The authors correctly note that most attorneys would believe the attorney in this case
acted properly. They also posit that most nonlawyers would feel that something wrong had
taken place. In this book, and it is certainly not an original thought, they observe that people
“ask why lawyers so rarely seem to owe allegiance to the truth or basic concepts of justice.”
[FN4]
Certainly since the end of World War II, if not before, lawyers have moved ever further
from standards of absolute honesty and truthfulness, often justifying that movement by the
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requirement of zealous representation of the client and by absolute fealty to the principle of
confidentiality. The furtherance of the interests of the client are felt to justify, if not demand, the
use of any legal procedural devise, whether it accomplishes or thwarts one’s archaic notions of
“justice” and the touchstone for acceptable stretching and spinning of statements, is not “tell the
truth” but rather “maintain plausible deniability” or to “avoid provable lies.”
More often than not, lawyers, bar leaders and academicians dismiss the problem as
simply being one of erroneous perception by a public that simply does not understand the
complexities of the law and its practice, and assert that what is needed is simply a better educated
populace. The National Conference of Bar Presidents, however, through the Professional
Reform Initiative, does not approach the problem as one of perception, but rather as one of
reality. The title of the January 2003 Edition of the Resource Book for Bar Leaders [FN5 ] is
entitled “Re-Establishing Truthfulness, Honesty, and Integrity As Core Values of the Legal
Profession in Troubled Times.” I t is noteworthy that, while the overall mission of the
Professional Reform Initiative (PRI) is “[t]o increase public trust and confidence” the title
speaks of “re-establishing” values, rather than simply restoring the public perception that such
values already exist.
“In recent years, there has been considerable debate within the legal profession about
what should be reckoned as the “core values” that distinguish lawyers from other
professionals.”[FN6] The report notes that this debate has included issues of confidentiality,
independence of judgment, avoiding conflicts of interest, loyalty to clients and the prevention of
unauthorized practice by non-lawyers. “Strikingly, however, virtually no claim has been made
that truthfulness, honesty, and integrity qualify as core values of the legal profession... “ [FN 7]
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This observation is borne out in the reaction of most American law schools to the 1992
“McCrate Commission Report.” [FN 8] . At most of the schools, the typical response was to
strengthen the courses dealing with the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and to have
roundtable discussions about the importance of pro bono work and community involvement. At
Wake Forest University Law School, incoming classes were required to read and discuss Harper
Lee’s novel, “To Kill A Mockingbird.” [FN 9]. This is particularly ironic since the book
concludes with the central character, Atticus Finch, colluding with the town sheriff to obstruct
justice by lying about the circumstances of the death of the story’s villain. [FN 10]
Modern treatises, casebooks and other teaching materials are virtually devoid of any address of
issues of character. By contrast, consider these passages from legal texts written and published at
the end of the 19th century or early in the 20th:
“The ‘coached’ witness is almost always a bad one. But no advocate
ought to be guided by the mere dictates of prudence in such a matter;
his sole guides should be honor and integrity. The client may have a right
to his talents and skill, but not to his conscience and integrity.” [FN 11]

“The true barrister will also scorn the practice of distorting the language of
the testimony by his argument, or putting into the mouth of another words and
sentiments he did not utter.” [FN 12]

“An advocate should not descend to the insidious art of inducing a witness to
answer with one meaning and assume his reply to bear another, and thus lead
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him to give evidence which, intended to be true, shall have the effect of falsehood.
Such conduct is a species of criminal trickery so nearly allied to subornation of
perjury that it is difficult, from a moral point of view, to distinguish between them. [FN
13]
A review of modern treatises on trial advocacy, will yield virtually no such admonitions
or discussions. For example, John Nichola Iannuzzi’s “Handbook of Trial Strategies, 2nd ed.”
[FN 14] is a thorough and excellent treatment of strategy and technique in the conduct of
litigation, but there is not one word regarding any obligations of honesty and truthfulness. A
1954 text by Elliott L. Biskind illustrates a more modern approach, alerting the reader to an
ethical concern, but leaving it as a matter of “conscience:”
“To coach the witness to give the answer you want, or to suggest the
answer you want by the form of your question or by your manner of
asking it, is inviting trouble, quite apart from the unethical nature of
such practice. There is a clear line of demarcation between searching
the witness’ memory by penetrating questions and letting him know
in a more or less subtle manner what you want him to say. Whether
you see that line, or whether you choose not to see it and cross over it,
is for your own conscience to determine. The line may be thin but it is
there for you to see.” [FN 15 ]
This is not to suggest that these modern treatises are not honorable or that the authors are
not honest and truthful people who expect others to be the same. It simply illustrates that such
qualities as truthfulness and integrity are no longer a “core value” of modern legal writing, nor do
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such values occupy a position of high consciousness in modern legal thought.
This degradation or abandonment of principle is bad enough for the legal profession, but
now it seems to have infected all of American society. Beginning with Watergate in the early
seventies, television began to provide society with more and more opportunities to see the law,
lawyers and the institutions of the law in operation. Up until that time, America’s most common
experience with courtrooms had been the Perry Mason television series. Mason, played by
Raymond Burr, was more brilliant detective than legal strategist and justice always prevailed by
honest perseverance and nothing more. [FN 16] Then came the sensational 1995 trial of
Orenthal James Simpson for the murder of his ex-wife Nicole Brown Simpson and her friend
Ronald Goldman. For weeks, live television brought to America every public detail of a trial that
involved excruciatingly complex evidentiary inquiries, convoluted procedural challenges and
endless tactical strategies. When California trial Judge Lance Ito announced the not-guilty
verdict at 10:00 A.M. (PST) on October 3, 1995, 91% of all people watching television were
watching him, and the majority of them were convinced that “winning” had nothing to do with
truth, but more to do with how skillfully one played the game.
Shortly after O. J. Simpson was set free so that he could begin the pursuit of the “real
killers” (a pursuit which will apparently be successful only if they are hiding on a golf course in
Florida) the American public was given another long and public legal soap opera known as
“Whitewater.”[FN 17] During the Watergate hearings [FN 18] twenty five years earlier, society
repeatedly saw the politically powerful seeking to avoid responsibility by a present lack of
recollection, or by “taking the fifth” when assertions of the inability to recall details would not be
believable. In the course of the Whitewater investigation of alleged misconduct by President
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Bill Clinton and his wife, Hillary Rodham Clinton, a former member of a prominent Little Rock,
Arkansas law firm, we saw another, somewhat different, form of legal “fine tuning” whereby
statements which were technically true were used to create a mistaken belief in the hearer and to
thus cover and hide the real truth. We also saw, on a wider scale than ever before, the use of
semantic distortion. President Clinton, in depositions regarding his alleged affairs or encounters
with several different women, hedged his responses by questioning the meaning of the words
“alone” and even “is.” [FN 19] One of his most famous assertions of innocence involved the
meaning of the phrase “have sexual relations.” In every case he was apparently attempting to
avoid telling the truth without telling “a lie”, as though this would be an acceptable and
honorable result. A similar and related tactic was used by a lawyer from the Little Rock,
Arkansas Rose Law Firm, where Mrs. Clinton had been an attorney dealing with the Whitewater
developers. At some point in preparing to respond to allegations of wrongdoing, he, or someone
else in his firm, had written the notation “Vacuum [certain Whitewater related] files.” When the
memo notation was discovered by investigators and questioned, the lawyer asserted that the
word was being used as a noun, that there was a “vacuum”, i.e. nothing, in the files, rather than
as a verb (meaning an instruction to “clean out” the files.). In a casual discussion of the matter in
the faculty lounge, this author expressed his incredulity that an attorney in a major law firm and
an officer of the court would make such an obviously false assertion in an official proceedings
(rather than relying on the then in vogue response of “no present recollection” of the meaning of
the notation.) The comment made was that while he might escape any legal consequence since it
would be difficult to prove that he had committed perjury, his reputation for honesty would
surely be sullied. But a colleague, a person of impressive intellect and unquestionable personal
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integrity, insisted that the statement had to be accepted as true, unless it could be proven to be
false. Essentially, the position of this learned person was that anything which cannot be proven
to be false is, in fact, the truth. Since the Whitewater attorney’s statement could not likely be
disputed, as his own interpretation of the meaning of the notation, then the attorney was
necessarily telling the “truth.” So, it would appear, at least in the professor’s mind, anything
which does not constitute “perjury” is “truth” and thus, there is no such thing as simply lying.
That casual conversation planted the seed for this article. Is it possible that there is no longer any
distinction between “perjury” and “lying” and between “criminal” and “wrong” in our society?
Has honesty, as a value of societal behaviour been replaced with legality? Is that why the
Publisher’s Clearing House deems it proper to send out advertisements that say “You have
definitely won $5,000,000" with the rather significant qualification “if your numbers match the
winning numbers” hidden deeply in the accompanying fine print, or major banks send letters
addressed, even to infants, informing them that they have been “Pre-approved” for loans or credit
cards, when, of course, they have not been approved at all, but it is simply a “come-on” to get
them to apply for such loans or credit cards?

Is it acceptable in social and commercial

discourse, as well as in a judicial proceeding, to mislead, to deceive, to lie, as long as it isn’t
perjury?
Today, much of society, having witnessed on television the machinations of highly
publicized police investigations, pre-trial proceedings, trials, both civil and criminal, and
congressional hearings, as well as the endless “talking-head-legal-consultant” shows, not to
mention Judge Judy, Judge J. Brown, Texas Justice , Judge Hatchett, .People’s Court, Divorce
Court and the 24 hour Court TV cable channel, seems to have accepted such “sharp practices” as
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the norm and adopted such behaviour in all of our social and business intercourse. As American
society has gained more intimate, though often inaccurate, knowledge of the law, lawyers and
the legal system, more and more people would probably react to the attorney who artfully
defeated the claim of the wrongfully discharged nurse’s aide with grudging admiration of the
attorney for “playing the game” so well. Has society discarded honesty and fairness as the
benchmarks of behaviour in favor of “winning” what seems to have become a contest, with only
bare technical rules rather than any sort of moral compass? Certainly there are citizens who still
cling to the notion that it is wrong to seek advantage over another by artifice or trickery, but
many seem to have long since succumbed to a cynicism that all of life, certainly business life, is
like a lawsuit or a negotiation and that one’s conduct is not important, only the outcome. It is no
longer important to be right, only to win. Cleverly avoiding, evading, distorting and “spinning”
the truth has become acceptable. So, here at the beginning of a new century, we have a legal
system, including its practitioners, which arguably has discarded truthfulness and honesty as core
values and, through public exposure has arguably infected all of society.[FN 20] There is
certainly evidence of an infectious malady of some sort in the corporate community in this
country when one looks at the absolute legal and financial chaos of the past decade:
Enron: $80 Billion in market value evaporated into bankruptcy; 4,500 jobs lost .
Global Crossing: $40 Billion in lost market value; 2,000 jobs lost.
Tyco: $86 Billion in lost market value; 5,973 jobs lost.
WorldCom: More than $100 Billion in lost market value; 17,000 jobs lost.[FN 21]
The list goes on to include major accounting firms, such as Arthur Anderson and major
financial players such as Merrill Lynch, J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. and Citigroup. Even that
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once sweetheart sweet-tooth company, Krispy Kreme Doughnuts is accused of what is called
“aggressive accounting” practices in valuing its franchise operations for repurchase, and
investors have seen two-thirds of the market value of their shares evaporate. In so many of the
corporate and accounting scandals of the 1990's and into the first decade of the 21st century, the
devices used have not been “lying” but rather a process of making “true” statements that
completely obscured the truth. Pretty much the same process that goes on in the practice of law
every single day..
There were cases of outright greed and simple theft such as the raiding of Tyco by Dennis
Koslowski to provide him with a $6,000 shower curtain and a $2,000,000 birthday party for his
wife, complete with toga clad attendants and a Jimmy Buffett concert. But overt thieves have
been around forever and are a problem for society, not the representatives of it. The more
troubling symptom in these corporate scandals is the epidemic of cleverly contrived transactions,
involving numerous obviously intelligent, ambitious and seemingly honest participants. Consider
just two of the transactions attending the ultimate collapse of Enron, one involving Merrill
Lynch and the other involving Citigroup. Both were examples of very clever manipulation of
facts and statements to create an illusion of corporate profit, while hiding the reality of corporate
debt. In each case, the transactions were structured in such a way that statements made were, in
fact, literally true, but the illusion created was completely false.
Merrill Lynch and the Nigerian barges. According to an SEC complaint, executives at
Merrill Lynch, including investment banker Robert Furst and executives from Enron devised a
plan in December, 1999, whereby Enron, faced with a shortfall in earnings, could boost its yearend profits. The first of those transactions involved three Nigerian floating energy generating
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stations, or “barges” which were “sold” by Enron to a Merrill Lynch entity for $7 million in
equity and $21 million in debt. Enron recorded the sale at a profit of $12 million in the fourth
quarter of 1999. In fact, it was understood that Enron would ensure that Merrill Lynch would be
able to resell the barges within six months at a price that would generate a reasonable return on
the investment to Merrill Lynch. Although quite literally a sale had occurred, the reality was that
the payment made to Enron was a loan secured by the barges. The full understanding of the
transactions was allegedly confirmed later in December in a telephone call between Merrill
Lynch executives and Andrew Fastow, Enron's former chief financial officer. Also during
December, 1999, in a joint effort to boost Enron’s fourth quarter earnings, Enron agreed to pay
Merrill a $17 million fee to enter into a "virtually offsetting" energy trades that boosted Enron's
profits by about $50 million, according to the SEC complaint. Again, literally true statements
but not the “whole truth”. [FN 22]
Citgroup and Yosemite Partnership. Also in 1999, Richard Caplan, formerly a lawyer
with Jones Day, but by then a rising executive at Citigroup helped Enron further with its
earnings problems by the creation and funding of Yosemite partnership which then entered into
transactions with Enron, common in the energy industry at the time, known as “pre-pays” or
advance payment for future deliveries of oil or other energy forms. In fact, Enron assured that
Yosemite would get its money back plus a reasonable return through the re-sale of the future
deliveries, if necessary to Enron or an Enron entity. Here again, the fact of pre-payment was a
literally true statement, and Enron reported the sale as income, but the reality was that this was a
disguised loan by Citigroup to Enron.
While the executives of Merrill Lynch and of Citigroup knew that they were creating a

11

false illusion, and in fact that was their whole purpose, they apparently did not consider it to be
lying. One email from an employee of Citigroup even boasted: “Gives some oomph to
revenues...E[nron] gets money that gives them c[ash]flow but does not show up as big D debt.”
[FN 23] In fact, so far, none of the participants from either Merrill Lynch or Citigroup have
faced any criminal charges. No charges of perjury, fraud, etc. True, the companies have paid
huge fines and disgorgement of profits because SEC rules have a much higher requirement of
disclosure.
The distinction between the “bright line” and strict requirements of the Securities Act,
and the broad grey area of “shady” but not illegal conduct that has so permeated the capital
markets during the past decade is further illustrated by the case of another Enron banker, J P
Morgan Chase & Co. which engaged in the same kind of “pre-pay” transactions with Enron
through an off-shore financing vehicle called Mahonia Ltd. This series of transactions, designed
to allow Enron to boost its earnings reports by the manipulation of futures sales, was
indistinguishable from the Citigroup/Yosemite transactions. When Enron collapsed, J.P.
Morgan called upon West LB, part of a syndicate of banks that had provided Mahonia with a
$165 million letter of credit, a common form of risk underwriting to insure against default on the
prepays between Enron and Mahonia, to cover the losses sustained by Mahonia in the failure of
Enron to deliver under the prepay contracts. WestLB refused to honor the letter of credit,
alleging that the transactions were part of a "fraudulent scheme" that essentially disguised loans
to the energy company by J.P. Morgan through Mahonia Ltd. J.P. Morgan sued WestLB in
London’s High Court of Justice in January, 2004. On August 3, 2004, Justice Jeremy Cooke
ruled in favor of J.P. Morgan and Mahonia, saying that how Enron accounted for them didn't
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breach U.S. accounting and securities rules, and thus did not constitute any such fraudulent
scheme. He ordered the WestLB-led banking syndicate to pay up on the letter of credit, plus
interest and costs.
"Enron's accounting for the prepays was not in breach of U.S. Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles," he wrote in his opinion. He added that its "accounting for these
transactions did not constitute a breach of U.S. securities law." [FN 24]
“The judgment could have ramifications for a class-action lawsuit in the U.S. stemming
from the collapse of Enron because the court ruled that the banks accounted for the transactions
properly, securities lawyers say.” [FN 25]
The Enron bankers seemed to be operating under the assumption that obscuring the truth,
even outright deception, were acceptable practice as long as no deliberate lies were told, and
Justice Cooke apparently agreed. However, similar cases were brought in New York by
insurance companies, seeking to avoid liability under the performance bonds provided regarding
Enron, on the same grounds present in the WestLB case in London. The banks reached a
settlement with the insurance companies. [ FN 26] In October, 2003, the District Court for the
Southern District of New York concluded that UniCredito Italiano, S.p.A. and Bank Polska Kasa
Opieki SA could pursue their claims for fraud and civil conspiracy against Chase and CitiCorp
based upon the same conduct in connection with Enron. [FN 27]

So, were the various parties

simply manipulating the circumstances and permissibly “spinning” the facts to create the
appearance most favorable to their purposes, or were they simply lying to obtain evil ends? The
English judge decided the former while the New York court has not ruled, only concluding that
there is an issue to be tried. Does the law, in fact, condone such “passive” lying, deliberate
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deception by the making of true, but incomplete, statements, and reserve its condemnation only
for “active” lying? [FN 28.]
Actually, the substantive law, procedural rules and the codes of professional conduct
are filled with examples that certainly create the appearance of condoning such practices. And
this appearance that may well have infected American society. The daily public disclosure and
broadcast of such examples could easily lead the untrained [and for that matter, the trained] to
believe that such conduct is “perfectly legal.” And when the distinction between technical
legality and societal norms of behavior have been blurred, if not in fact eliminated, we may face
very real problems.
For example, the crime of perjury is most often defined by the law as: “the willful and
corrupt false swearing or affirming, after an oath lawfully administered in the course of a judicial
or quasi-judicial proceeding, as to some matter material to the issue or point in question. [FN 29]
One assumes that the purpose of the law against perjury is not to protect the moral
character of the person giving testimony in the judicial proceedings, but rather, to protect the
judicial proceedings from the introduction of misinformation that would result in the fact-finder,
whether judge or jury, being diverted from finding the truth. While that may be the purpose of
the law, the cases do not pursue that purpose, focusing instead, not on the result of the testimony,
but the inherent character of the testimony.

In other words, true statements, even though made

with the purpose of deceiving the fact-finder as to the true facts, do not constitute perjury.
U.S. v. Eddy [FN 30] is a perfect example of this distinction between merely punishing
untrue statements and actually protecting the proceedings from the injection of misinformation.
Eddy was indicted in 1982 under 18 U.S.C. § 1014 [FN 31] for knowingly making a
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false report or statement for the purpose of influencing the action of a federally insured bank. He
was acquitted by a jury of that charge but was then indicted and convicted on two counts of
perjury. In connection with testimony while being cross-examined during an in camera hearing in
the earlier criminal case. The statements which were the basis of the perjury indictment were
made in a hearing in chambers where the United States sought to prove that Eddy had used an
Ohio State University College of Medicine diploma and an Ohio State University college
transcript in efforts to enlist as a physician in the United States Navy. Count I of the indictment
for perjury was based upon the following dialogue.
PROSECUTOR: Are you the same Terrance Alan Eddy that on or about March 20, 1981,
contacted the Navy Medical Programs Recruiter for the Navy Recruiting District of Jacksonville,
Florida?
EDDY: Yes, sir. PROSECUTOR: Claiming to be a doctor graduated from the Ohio State
University School of Medicine?
EDDY: No, sir.
PROSECUTOR: And expressing a desire to join the Navy as a doctor?
EDDY: No, sir.
PROSECUTOR: And as proof or as part of your personal history submitted a diploma from the
Ohio State University College of Medicine?
EDDY: No, sir.
PROSECUTOR: And official college transcript?
EDDY: No.
EDDY: I would guess so, yes, sir.
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..............
PROSECUTOR: In that case, I would ask you the question again. Are you the same Terrance
Alan Eddy who attempted to gain staff privileges at the Putnam County Community Hospital in
Palatka, Florida, and in doing so showed credentials from the Ohio State University and a
certificate from the Board of Medical Examiners from the State of Florida indicating that you
were licensed to practice medicine in that state? And I think we can take that to mean you
represented yourself as a physician. Did you do that?
EDDY: Like I said, I don't remember going there. I don't remember doing this action. No, sir.
[FN 32]
In fact, Eddy had not received a medical degree from Ohio State University and did not
have a valid certificate from the Florida Board of Medical Examiners. He had submitted fake
credentials in his application to the Navy. Thus, he argued, his answer of “No” to the question of
whether he had submitted “credentials” was factually true since what he did submit were invalid
fakes. The court agreed and reversed his convictions. “Thus, it is undisputed that Eddy did not
submit an "official" Ohio State University diploma and a genuine university transcript during his
meetings with naval recruiters. Hence, Eddy's negative responses to the prosecutor's questions
were the literal truth "in light of the meaning that he, not his interrogator, attributed to the
questions and answers," ...........and therefore, could not support a perjury conviction.” [FN 33]
The District Court in Kentucky based its decision in Eddy in large part because of
Bronston v. United States, [FN 34], in which the Court held a witness may not be convicted of
"perjury for an answer, under oath, that is literally true but not responsive to the question asked
and arguably misleading by negative implication."

16

In June 1964, Bronston Productions, petitioned for an arrangement with creditors under
Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. s 701 et seq. On June 10, 1966, a referee in
bankruptcy held a s 21(a) hearing to determine, for the benefit of creditors, the extent and
location of the company's assets.
In the course of that hearing, Samuel Bronston gave the following answers as a witness in
answer to questions posed by a lawyer representing the creditors:
'Q. Do you have any bank accounts in Swiss banks, Mr. Bronston?
'A. No, sir.
'Q. Have you ever?
'A. The company had an account there for about six months, in Zurich.
'Q. Have you any nominees who have bank accounts in Swiss banks?
'A. No, sir.
'Q. Have you ever?
'A. No, sir.'
In fact, for a period of five years, between October 1959 and June 1964, Bronston had a
personal bank account at the International Credit Bank in Geneva, Switzerland, into which he
made deposits and upon which he drew checks totaling more than $180,000.
There was no dispute that Bronston’s answers were literally truthful: (a) He did not at
the time of questioning have a Swiss bank account. (b) Bronston Productions, Inc., did have the
account in Zurich described . (c) Neither at the time of questioning nor before did he have
nominees who had Swiss accounts.
The prosecution theory was that , in order to mislead his questioner, petitioner answered
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the second question with literal truthfulness but unresponsively addressed his answer to the
company's assets and not to his own--thereby implying that he had no personal Swiss bank
account at the relevant time.
The Court concluded that as long as the statements made were true, even though they
were not responsive to the question posed and even if made with the intent to mislead the
statements could not be the basis for a perjury conviction under 18. U.S.C.A 1621.
So, is it “legal” to deliberately give misleading and deceptive testimony in a judicial
proceeding? Clearly yes.[FN 35]
Similarly, the making of literally true statements, even though made with a conscious
intent to evade truthful answer to the questions posed in connection with statements made to
agencies of the U.S. Government will not serve as the basis for conviction of violations of 18
U.S.C.A. s.1001 [ FN 36] In United States v. Good [ FN 37] the defendant stated, on her
application for an airport security badge, that she had not been convicted of “theft, fraud,
dishonesty, or misrepresentation.” She had, in fact, been convicted in Virginia of embezzlement.
The court concluded that, since the question did mention embezzlement, her actions did not
constitute the making of a “false, fictitious, and fraudulent statement and representation” under s.
1001. Similarly, in U.S. v. Baer [FN 38] defendant was applying for an airport security badge
and the application contained this question: "During the previous ten years, have you ever been
convicted or found not guilty by reason of insanity of ........ (20) Unlawful possession, use, sale,
distribution, or manufacture of an explosive or weapon; ..." The defendant answered the question
in the negative. In fact, the defendant was charged in 1992 with “ brandishing a firearm”, a
misdemeanor offense, in violation of Virginia Code § 18.2-282, to which the defendant pled
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guilty and received a sentence of probation. The court concluded that, since the question
answered related to “possession, use, sale, distribution, or manufacture” and not to
“brandishing”, the answer did not constitute a violation of Sec. 1001. In both cases, as in others,
it was apparent that the purpose of the question, particularly in light of heightened concerns for
airport security in the wake of 9/11, was to reveal offenses that might bear on the important
issues of safety and security. Nonetheless, the intent to mislead and to hide that information was
not actionable under the applicable statute.
The traditional civil remedy for deception, common law fraud, required: a material
misrepresentation; that was false; that was known to be false when made; or was made recklessly
as a positive assertion without knowledge of its truth; that was intended to be acted upon; that
was relied upon; and that caused injury. [FN 39]
Is recovery allowed or relief granted in fraud cases because of the making of the
statements that resulted in the fraud or is it because of the effect of the fraud, i.e. that the injured
party is put under a misapprehension of the true facts to his or her detriment? While many acts
of overt deception, which the criminal law does not condemn, may also evade civil liability, the
cases are not as quick to excuse truthful, but misleading statements. If there is a confidential
relationship between the parties, then it is generally agreed that to avoid a charge of fraud, there
must be not only truthful statements, but there must be full disclosure. Similarly, where one has
made a statement which was true or believed to be true at the time, if the maker of the statement
acquires knowledge that the statement is untrue, or that circumstances have changed so that the
statement does not remain true, there may be an obligation to correct the understanding of the
party to whom the statement was made. [FN 40] And if literally true statements are made, but
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thereby create a mistaken understanding by the party to whom the statement is made, then the
party making the statement may be required to correct the misunderstanding. [FN 41] Where,
however, no statement is made, in the absence of some affirmative obligation to make a
statement, the fact that a party is misled by silence generally does not constitute fraud. [FN 42]
If the law, as it does in so many cases, requires sufficient disclosure to reveal the truth of the
matter, and thereby, presumably, accepts that such disclosure is not an unreasonable burden, one
wonders why the law does not always seek such a laudable result? If one is mislead and
deceived, what difference should it make whether it is because of untrue statements, true
statements or no statements at all? If the avoiding of the deception can be accomplished by a
burden placed on the other party that is not unreasonable, then why should that burden not always
be there?
Libel and Defamation
The common law condemned lying as a social ill and provided a remedy when the lies
were injurious of reputation. If one made defamatory statements about another, truth was a
defense, but defamatory statements were presumed to be false and the burden was on the person
making the statements to justify the resulting injury by proving the truth of the statement. But
modern decisions have eroded the principles of libel and slander to the point that the exceptions
to the rule far outweigh the rule itself. Either for reasons of deemed necessity for the “proper and
efficient administration of justice” or because it is thought that such statements are protected by
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, today’s law, in a variety of
circumstances, grants us the privilege to lie with impunity about another person to their
detriment.
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It is generally held that “a defamatory statement made in due course of a judicial
proceeding is absolutely privileged and will not support a civil action for defamation, even
though it be made with express malice." [FN 43] . The public policy underlying this privilege "is
grounded upon the proper and efficient administration of justice. Participants in the judicial
process must be able to testify or otherwise take part without being hampered by fear of
defamation suits."[FN 44] In deciding whether a statement is absolutely privileged, a court must
determine (1) whether the statement was made in the course of a judicial proceeding; and (2)
whether it was sufficiently relevant to that proceeding. [FN 45] These issues are questions of law
to be decided by the court. [FN 46]

It is noteworthy that, in none of the examinations of this

issue, is the truthfulness of the defamatory statements raised. Thus, not only may one make
defamatory statements with actual malice, the statements need not be true. While it may be
necessary to protect one who must, in the course of giving testimony, utter defaming remarks
about someone, it is difficult see how extending that protection to untruthful statements is an aid
to the “proper and efficient administration of justice.” [FN47]
Under the decisions of our Supreme Court, we may, with very little risk, utter and publish
lies about our public officials. Judges of the various courts must endure the public criticism of
those who may be disaffected by their decisions, and may not punish by criminal contempt those
who level that criticism [FN 48] This is true even though the utterances contain “half-truths” and
“misinformation.” [FN 49] In New York Times v. Sullivan [FN 50 ] the Court extended this rule
to cover public criticism of all public officials, and protecting the critic from civil liability as
well. The Court deemed it necessary to afford us the constitutional guarantee of free speech
under the First Amendment. “The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that
21

prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his
official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice'--that is, with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” While the
announced rule does provide an exception for false statements, the exception is so restrictive that
there are virtually no cases where a public official has been allowed recovery of damages for lies
circulated about his or her performance or conduct. Very shortly after New York Times was
decided, the Court revisited the question of defamation and civil liability in a case involving
Wally Butts, the Athletic Director of the University of Georgia [FN 51] The Saturday Evening
Post had published an article accusing Butts of having telephoned Paul “Bear” Bryant, the head
coach of the football team at the University of Alabama, in 1962, to give him information
regarding plays and strategies to be used by the Georgia team in the upcoming Southeastern
Conference football game between the two schools. [As an interesting aside, the Court noted that
Butts was not employed by the University of Georgia, a state institution, but by the Georgia
Athletic Association, a private corporation. Thus, concluded the Court, he was not a “public
official” as he presumably would have been if employed by the university. Apparently, the
public policy interest and constitutional address of our right to question and criticize the
character and conduct of our elected officials, our legislators, executives and the persons who
control the administration of our courts is equally concerned with preserving our right to
condemn and slander the decision made on a crisp Fall Saturday afternoon to run an off-tackle
slant when facing third down and long yardage.] Butts sued the publisher of the magazine and
was awarded compensatory and punitive damages. The Supreme Court determined that, while
Butts was not a public official, he was a “public figure” and thus the public had a compelling
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interest in knowing information regarding his conduct similar to the public interest in
information regarding public officials. The Court concluded that constitutional considerations
similar to those present in New York Times precluded leaving the issue of damages for
defamation of a public figure to state libel laws. Justice Harlan wrote the majority opinion that a
public figure could recover damages for a defamatory falsehood only where the substance
demonstrated apparent substantial danger to reputation and then only upon a showing of highly
unreasonable conduct constituting extreme departure from the standards of investigation and
reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers. Justices Black and Douglass concurred
in result, but insisted the First Amendment should preclude the media from liability in all cases,
presumably including deliberate falsehoods. Chief Justice Warren concurred in result but saw no
reason to carve out a distinct and separate rule but would simply extend the rule of New York
Times to include both public officials and public figures. Subsequent cases have done just that
current law makes no distinction between the two. [FN 52]
While it is certainly true that there is a strong public interest in transparency of
government, free flow of information and full and open debate of issues and ideas, the broad
definition of “public officials” to include a grade school wrestling coach [FN 53] and the absence
of any definition by the Court of the term “public figure” [FN 54 ] has virtually eviscerated the
common law threat of punishment or liability for defamation. Certainly in the case of
newspapers, television, etc., the mere fact that one has drawn the attention of such outlets would
seem to make one, axiomatically, a public figure. While the Supreme Court has not yet adopted
the radical position urged by Justices Black and Douglass in the Butts case, that media should
enjoy absolute immunity from libel actions, the Court did, in 1986, determine that the media
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should not be subject to the common law rules of defamation. In Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc.
v. Hepps, [FN 55] the Court held that even in the case of a private figure, one who did not meet
either the definition of public official or public figure, if the defamatory statement was in regard
to a matter of “public concern” then the constitutional interests were such that the common law
presumption that any defamatory statement was false would be set aside and the burden would be
placed upon the aggrieved party to prove that the statement was false in order for damages to be
awarded. Here again, the term “public concern” is not defined by the Court and it would seem to
include anything that the media determined newsworthy enough to make comment in the first
place.
While England does not have a written constitution, it seems to have a vibrant democracy
and certainly an active press, and yet it seems to have managed to preserve both the right to
criticize government and to have an open debate of ideas without sacrificing due regard for truth
an honesty. Perhaps one of the most dramatic illustrations of the difference between English law
and our own was an incident during Margaret Thatcher’s campaign for a third term as Prime
Minister of England. Her principal opponent was Neal Kinnock of the Labour Party. During the
course of the heated campaign an allegation appeared in the newspaper that Ms. Thatcher, prior
to her marriage to Denis Thatcher, and while she was still a student at Oxford University, had
allowed Denis to spend the night in her room. The accusation was false and Ms. Thatcher
threatened a libel suit with the result that the Kinnock camp made an immediate retraction and
apology. Under English law, “fair comment” is an affirmative defense under which a defendant
must prove that the alleged libel was “comment” and that the “comment” was objectively “fair”
or that it could honestly have been said by an honest person. Truth is also a defense, but the
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English system still adheres to the common law presumption and the burden of defending if one
chooses to make a defamatory statement. The English apparently feel that neither the press nor
political opponents should have the privilege of lying with impunity. In this country political
campaigns, particularly on the national level, have spawned a complete industry in the art of
fabrication and accusation. So called “spin doctors” act without fear of any restraint or penalty.
Anyone who steps into the political arena must do so with the awareness that they, and their
entire family, may be attacked with the most vicious lies and the law will afford them no
practical protection whatever.
As this article is being finalized, the country is embroiled in hotly contested presidential
campaign between the incumbent, republican George W. Bush and the democratic nominee,
Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts. One of the bitterest and most divisive issues in the
campaign is the military record of Senator Kerry who received several decorations for his service
in Vietnam. [FN 56] The validity of his record of service and of his combat decorations is
disputed by a privately funded political action group by the name of “Swift Boat Veterans for
Truth.” This group claims and publicly charges that Senator Kerry’s record is false and that he
did not deserve the decorations. If these charges are true, it is important that voters know it. If
the charges are not true then Senator Kerry has been most unjustly maligned. In England,
Senator Kerry, assuming the charges are untrue, would have already filed a libel action against
this group and we would all find our that the charges are untrue. In this country, our rules
regarding libel of public officials and political candidates are such that no such action will be
filed and, regardless of the outcome of the election, the issue will never be truly put to rest. The
political camp that loses the election will always feel either that a good and honest war hero was
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defeated by lies or that a fraudulent war hero occupies the White House. It is difficult to see how
that outcome is desirable. It would be far better if the courts could bring resolution.
Rules of Procedure.
The rules of civil procedure are ostensibly designed to provide for efficient administration
of justice and to insure the validity, relevance and authenticity of evidence submitted in a civil
case, and the rules of criminal procedure seek the same result for criminal proceedings with the
added concern of protection of the rights of the accused. One would think that with that being
the stated purpose, insuring that the “truth” be revealed in all proceedings would be among the
highest priorities. Actually, if that is so, it takes a well trained eye to see that priority in many of
the rules.
Exclusionary rule
Certainly the rule most maligned and misunderstood by the lay public, and for that matter
by many members of the legal profession, is the Exclusionary Rule under which highly
probative, even unquestionably accurate evidence, particularly confessions, are excluded because
of violations of the strictures of the Fourth, Fifth or Sixth Amendments. [FN 57] Under this rule
the truth is of no consequence. If the evidence is found by the court to have been obtained in
violation of the constitutional mandates, no matter how technical the violation, then out it goes
and often the factually guilty go free.
Parol Evidence Rule.
In contract law, as well as in the laws of conveyances, a particular fact may be
unquestionably true and there may be numerous ways to prove it, but the parol evidence rule will
often preclude the presentation of such proof or even asserting the existence of the fact. Not
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because it is not truthful assertion, but because the rule prohibits the assertion without regard to
the truth. The rule has a long history and certainly has a basis in legal reasoning, but to the
general public, seeing it in operation, it appears to have little or no regard for the truth. The same
is true of the Statute of Frauds. There may be evidence, of unimpeachable quality, that an
agreement was entered into, a promise was made, or a conveyance was intended, but the truth of
the matter is totally irrelevant if the Statute of Frauds [ FN 58] demands a writing. Once again,
the rule is ancient and has a solid foundation in legal reasoning ,, but it can hardly be said to be,
in any way, subservient to the truth.
The Statute of Wills.
How many families have been torn apart by disputes over the disposition of the assets of a
parent or other close relative? Under the Statute of Wills [FN 59], truth is simply of no
significance. It does not matter what quantum of proof, indeed that proof is indisputable or for
that matter that it is not disputed at all. An intended arrangement, even a promised arrangement
will be set aside if the technical rules of the statute of wills are not complied with. Disappointed
relations have not just felt betrayed by the law and disillusioned by it’s disregard for the truth,
they have killed over it. [FN 60]
The Rules of Professional Conduct.
Many of the rules by the which the legal profession is governed create an illusion of
dishonesty in the eyes of general society. Certainly the obligation to provide representation to
all, including those who are guilty of the most heinous crimes, will often lead the general public
to identify the attorney with the accused and the proficient representation of such a person is
equated with “trying to get them off.” This reaction, to the legitimate responsible legal
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representation of any accused, is regrettable but probably unavoidable. To be sure, there are
times when counsel for the accused will, in fact, identify with a guilty client and seek to assist
them in escaping justice by means that are unscrupulous. On such an occasion, it is not the rules
that are at fault, but rather the misconduct of the attorney.
However, some of these rules allow, or perhaps even require, conduct that, despite
hortatory exclamations of a high moral standard, ring hollow and empty when examined in light
of their true meaning and of actual practice.
Confidentiality.
The rules of client confidentiality were thoroughly debated in connection with the
replacement of the “Code of Professional Responsibility” [FN 61] by the “Model Rules” [FN
62]
Under the CPR, a lawyer could breach the confidentiality rules to reveal the intention of a
client to commit “a crime” and the information necessary to prevent the crime. [FN 63] In part,
the examination of the rules regarding confidentiality was prompted by financial losses incurred
by persons or institutions which losses might have been avoided by the disclosure of information
by attorneys for the actor which caused the loss. The most notorious case involved the O.P.M.
Leasing Company, Inc. (OPM) which defrauded lenders out of millions of dollars by faking
equipment leases. The New York law firm of Singer, Hutner, Levine and Seeman represented
the company in the lease-finance transactions from 1971 to 1980 and had to pay millions in
damages because it was aware of the practices of the company and did not disclose the facts to
lenders. [FN 64] The debate of the ABA House of Delegates opened in February, 1983 with the
proposal that the rule allowing disclosure of intent to commit a crime and of the information
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necessary to prevent a crime be expanded to include the prevention of financial loss and the
remedying of losses already caused. In the end, however, rather than an expansion of the
authority to disclose confidences, the exception was narrowed from the prevention of “a crime”
to the prevention of “a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death
or substantial bodily harm...” [FN 65 ] The result of that debate was, and remains controversial
and not all states have adopted the more narrow rule, instead retaining the original “crime
prevention” disclosure rule of CPR 4-101 [FN 66] and some have adopted the broader rule that
was initially proposed. [FN 67]
Here again, there is a difficult question of balancing what is perceived as a very necessary
sanctity, the guarantee of the privacy of any conversation between person and their attorney,
with the interests of society in having certain information made available to those whose lives
and/or fortunes may be adversely affected by the information or the lack of it. It is often difficult
for the general public to recognize the difference between protecting a client’s confidences and
“aiding and abetting” the client. The case of attorney Francis R. Belge of Syracuse, New York
is an extreme example. In 1973 Belge and another attorney were appointed as counsel for Robert
F. Garrow, Jr., who was charged with the crime of murder. In the course of his interviews with
his attorneys, Garrow confessed to three other murders including that of a young girl named
Alicia Hauck, who was known to be missing but was not yet known to the authorities or to her
parents to have been the victim of a homicide. Based upon the information provided by the
client, Belge, with the assistance of a friend, discovered Alicia’s body hidden in a remote spot in
the Oakwood Cemetery in Syracuse in September, 1973. Belge did not disturb the body nor did
he report its existence or location to anyone. In June, 1974, after his client was found to be
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insane and thus immune from prosecution for the murder, Belge revealed the fact of Alicia
Hauck’s death and the location of the body. The public reaction was predictable. That the
attorney would allow Hauck’s parents to continue to hold out hope, that he would allow the
authorities to continue the futile search for a missing person and that he would allow the body of
this young girl to remain hidden without a proper burial was more than many could accept under
any theory. The District Attorney referred the matter to the Onondaga Grand Jury and Belge was
indicted on the only charges anyone could come up with, violations of public health rules of the
State of New York dealing with the disposition of dead bodies.
On August 1, 1975, the judge of the County Court dismissed the charges. [FN 68] After
a lengthy examination of the origin and purpose of the rules of privileged communications, Judge
Ormand N. Gale dismissed the indictments, concluding that “Francis R. Belge conducted himself
as an officer of the Court with all the zeal at his command to protect the constitutional rights of
his client.” [FN 69] The dismissal was affirmed by the Appellate Division [FN 70] and by the
New York Supreme Court [FN 71] Was such an affront to standards of compassion and decency
really necessary? Did Belge err in favor of his client without due regard for the interests of the
parents or of society? Could he have revealed the information about the body without
incriminating his client? What if the authorities had suspected Garrow and had directed the
question to Belge “Has your client told you anything that might help us find this girl?” Would
Belge be allowed to lie to them? Would Belge be required to do so? If there was evidence at
the scene of the crime that would implicate the client if discovered as a result of the disclosure of
the existence and location of the body? If not, how would the client be compromised by the
disclosure? If so, couldn’t the evidence be excluded so that revelation of the existence and the
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location of the body would meet the needs of the parents and society without a denial of the
murderer’s constitutional rights? Certainly it is difficult for the general public to understand the
necessity of the confidentiality under the circumstances. Certainly it creates the appearance that
the rules of professional conduct require the attorney to ally himself or herself with the goals of
the criminal to avoid detection.
Before the Courts.
The rule of confidentiality often requires the attorney to withhold the truth. Model Rule
1.31 requires “reasonable diligence” in the representation of a client and the commentary requires
“zeal” in the advocacy.

Zealous advocacy may require the attorney to actively hide the truth

from the fact finder. Consider a litigation attorney in either a civil or criminal case. The
opposing side presents a witness whose testimony, if accepted, will be damaging to the client’s
interest. The attorney knows for certain that the testimony the witness has given is accurate and
true in every regard. The attorney has available information that will impeach the general
credibility of the witness. May the attorney impeach the witness? Most practitioners and
authorities would agree that the attorney may do so [FN 72] , and under the standard of zealous
representation [FN 73], must do so. When the attorney proceeds with that process whether by
cross examination or by rebuttal evidence, isn’t the attorney knowingly and deliberately trying to
steer the fact finder away from the truth? Isn’t the attorney trying to convince the fact finder that
the witness’s testimony is untrue, when in fact it is known to be true by the attorney. That isn’t
lying?
How does an the system balance the sixth amendment right to assistance of counsel, the
fifth amendment right of a criminal defendant to testify and present evidence in his or her own
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behalf and the obligation of an attorney, under the rules of professional responsibility, not to
“..counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely...” [FN 74] The case law, commentary and various
state rules of professional conduct are in total disarray. There is confused disagreement whether
the issue is how to deal with a client who intends to commit perjury or one who has already done
so.
In Pennsylvania in 1967, Norman Wilcox was on trial in state court on a charge of rape. His
court appointed attorney refused to allow him to take the stand and testify to an alibi because she
believed his testimony would be perjured. After a heated exchange, the attorney informed the
court of the disagreement and stated that if the defendant insisted on testifying, she would move
to withdraw as counsel. The court then informed Wilcox of this and warned him that if he chose
to testify he would have to proceed without counsel. Wilcox did not take the stand and was
convicted. Later, Wilcox filed for a writ of habeas corpus on grounds that the combined action
of the court and the attorney had deprived him of the right to take the stand and testify in his own
defense, a right afforded to him under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The
District Court granted the petition and the Third Circuit affirmed, concluding that the attorney’s
conjecture about the client’s perjury were not grounds for the action taken. [FN 75]
A few years later the Kansas Supreme Court was faced with a similar case wherein
counsel, believing the defendant intended to commit perjury, sought to withdraw and informed
the trial judge of his reason for doing so. The judge required counsel to continue the
representation despite the resurfacing of the issue in court when the defendant complained that he
was not being fairly represented by counsel who was being forced to remain against his will.
After his conviction for armed robbery, defendant appealed to the Supreme Court of Kansas and

Page 32 of 46

the court affirmed the conviction concluding that (a) the duty of the attorney to the court made
the motion to withdraw perfectly proper, (b) the disclosure of the attorney to the court that the
client intended to commit perjury did not constitute a violation of the attorney-client
confidentiality because of the exception which allows disclosure of intent to commit a crime
(perjury) and (c) requiring counsel to continue to represent defendant did not deprive defendant
of competent representation and thus defendant received a fair trial. [FN 76]
Just as there is disparity in the case law, there is disagreement among commentators. [FN
77]
The Supreme Court addressed the issue, but narrowly, in Nix v. Whiteside [FN 78]
concluding that Whiteside, on trial for murder, was not deprived of his sixth amendment right to
counsel when his attorney threatened to inform the court and to withdraw if Whiteside presented
false testimony to concoct a claim of self-defense. The Eighth Circuit [FN 79] had concluded
that the attorney’s actions constituted a threat to violate the attorneys duty to preserve the
confidentiality of the client’s communications. Justice Burger’s address to the issue is confined
to a single sentence without reference: “Moreover, accepted norms require that a lawyer disclose
his client’s perjury and fraud upon the courts.” [FN 80]. If there is such an “accepted norm” it is
well hidden, particularly if the jurisdiction has adopted Model Rule 1.6 [FN81] which limits
permissible disclosure to the prevention of criminal acts which are likely to result in imminent
death or substantial bodily harm. Rule 3.3 of the MRPC requires “Candor Toward the Tribunal”
and implies, but does not specifically authorize disclosure, whether to prevent perjury or in the
case of perjury that has already occurred. The statement in the commentary that “Three
resolutions of this dilemma have been proposed” is recognition that the issue is not resolved by
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Rule 3.3. If Rule 3.3 does authorize disclosure of a client’s confidences in order to prevent or to
rectify the presentation of false evidence then it is arguably in conflict with Rule 1.6. [FN 82 ]
As recently as January, 2004, the Professionalism and Ethics Committee of the
California Bar issued Formal Opinion 2003-01 “Client Perjury and the Criminal Defense
Attorney” [FN 83 ] holding to the position that as long as the attorney merely “believes” a client
is committing perjury, the attorney must continue to zealously represent the client, aiding the
client “in a fully professional examination and potential rehabilitation after cross-examination.”
If the attorney has actual knowledge, by virtue of the client’s admission, then the attorney must
first attempt to dissuade the client. If the client insists, then the attorney may, “but is not
encouraged” to seek to withdraw. “Rather, the attorney should advise the client of the risks of
perjury and the narrative form of testimony before proceeding with the narrative approach.”[FN
84 ]
In Negotiation.
Professor James J. White, in his 1980 examination and discussion of the then newly
formulated provisions in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct dealing with negotiation
(4.,.4.2, 4.3) [FN 85] concludes that truthfulness and honesty are not reasonable expectations and
are not required by the rules:
“ A final complication in drafting rules about truthfulness arises out of the paradoxical nature of
the negotiator’s responsibility. On the one hand the negotiator must be fair and truthful; on the
other he must mislead his opponent. Like the poker player, a negotiator hopes that his opponent
will overestimate the value of his hand. Like the poker player, in a variety of ways he must
facilitate his opponent's inaccurate assessment. The critical difference between those who are
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successful negotiators and those who are not lies in this capacity both to mislead and not to be
misled.

Some experienced negotiators will deny the accuracy of this assertion, but they will be

wrong. I submit that a careful examination of the behavior of even the most forthright, honest,
and trustworthy negotiators will show them actively engaged in misleading their opponents about
their true position. . . . To conceal one's true position, to mislead an opponent about one's true
settling point, is the essence of negotiation.” [FN 86]
This quote might suggest Professor White felt there was a contradiction, or rather
conflicting responsibilities, but his conclusions are quite singular. The following statement from
the article is unambiguous:
“Pious and generalized assertions that the negotiator must be “honest” or that the lawyer
must use “candor” are not helpful. They are at too high a level of generality and the fail
to appreciate the fact that truth and truthful behavior at one time in one set of
circumstances with one set of negotiators may be untruthful in another circumstance
(emphasis added) with other negotiators.” [FN 87]
Professor White may have drawn this rather startling conclusion about the transient relativity of
truth from what Professor Timothy Terrell called a strategic, almost comical, retreat by the ABA
from the literal requirement in Rule 4.1 that a lawyer must not make a false statement of material
fact. [FN 88] The Comment to 4.1 provides as follows: “Whether a particular statement should
be regarded as one of fact can depend on the circumstances. Under generally accepted
conventions in negotiation, certain types of statements ordinarily are not taken as statements of
material fact.”
What the commentary really means is not that facts may or may not be material. What it
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means is that certain statements should be recognized as the things about which one may
legitimately lie and should be expected to do so. Rule 4.1, as it is explained by Professor White
and understood and applied by most practitioners would be much more accurately written if it
provided:
“A lawyer should not make a false statement unless it is in regard to the kind of thing
other lawyers or other parties to the negotiation should reasonably expect the lawyer to
lie about.”.
A norm that contemplates and approves of outright deception cannot avoid having a
deleterious effect on the profession and further tarnishing the public perception of law and
lawyering. If one is expected to lie and to do so convincingly, then when must one suddenly stop
lying and be forthright? Moreover, the argument can be made that such a standard is not
necessary, discriminates against the impotent and poor in favor of the wealthy and powerful and
may even be counterproductive in the process of negotiation. [FN 89]
So, in so many different ways, the legal system, sometimes in balancing competing
interests and other times out of unexplainable neglect or a misguided sense of necessity, either
disregards or willingly sacrifices truth as a paramount value. And in today’s cable-ready society
it does so in public. If the law is going to be the example that society chooses to follow, then it
would seem to be desirable that the law set a better example. Can anyone dispute that there is
certainly room for improvement?
“Chicanery” is an archaic term that is seldom used in today’s vernacular, but it is a
practice that is altogether too common. The word is defined [FN 90] as “deception by artful
subterfuge or sophistry; a piece of sharp practice (as in law).” If one were to propose that
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“chicanery” be banned, many lawyers would agree, but if the proposal was to prohibit “sharp
practice” the reaction would probably be quite different. But here is the question: “Why should
we allow anything, other than neglect by the prosecuting party, which avoids or unduly delays the
decision of a case or controversy on its merits?” Demanding discovery depositions merely for
the sake of harassment and/or deliberately scheduling such a hearing at a time or place that will
inconvenience an opponent. Answering a request for discovery with truckloads of documents,
with the requested materials buried deep in the middle. There are any number of such “sharp
practices” which have nothing to do with merits of a case or with the efficiency of the justice
system. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure currently impose sanctions for frivolous
pleadings. [FN 91] Could not a similar rule impose sanctions upon such “sharp practices” if,
upon challenge, a valid purpose apart from delay or harassment could not be shown?
Why, in the law of perjury, fraud, Section 1001 violations, etc. must the actus reus be
limited to statements which are untrue, if the same harm that the law seeks to prevent or redress
is brought about be true statements? What if we adopt a principle which states “Any civil cause
of action, charge of unprofessional conduct or criminal charge which may be based on the
making of a false statement may also be based upon the making of a true statement if such
statement is proven, by the appropriate requisite burden, to have been made with the intent to
deceive.” The law should concern itself with the deception rather than the nature of the
statement.
In contract law we have long required fair and complete disclosure in contracts between
persons who are in certain confidential or fiduciary relationships, [FN 92] and found the
application and enforcement of that principle to be economically and judicially feasible. Why
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limit the principle.? Would a society where fairness is the norm not be desirable? Why not
extend the principle to all contracts?
Rules such as the Statute of Frauds and the Statute of Wills have ancient roots, which
make them venerable, but also make them somewhat obsolete. When they were passed, the
principle means of communication was by writings that were physically carried to the court
sitting in London. Today’s methods of communication and preservation and proof of
information did not exist when the best proof of an agreement was a physical document and the
most reliable proof of a deceased’ testamentary desire was two disinterested witnesses. It is time
for such doctrines to be reexamined in light of modern technology. A videotaped will which is
determined to be seamless should be accepted as authentic. There are any number of ways to
prove the existence and content of agreements, and a writing would not only be unnecessary, it
would be redundant. In any situation, where a departure from the rules of evidence or from the
rules of procedure is necessary to pursue the truth and will do no harm to the trustworthiness of
the evidence or the efficiency of the judicial or administrative process, the importance of rules
should be carefully weighed before the truth is not pursued. [FN 93]
Finally, the results in jurisdictions such as Louisiana should be closely followed to see
what mischief, if any, is done to the functioning of the legal system and the administration of
justice by the adoption of liberalized rules of attorney-client confidence. [FN 94] Unless some
real problem is shown, the American Bar Association should reconsider the position it adopted in
1983 with the new Model Code of Professional Responsibility, and regardless of the actions of
the ABA, every jurisdiction which has not already done so, should consider revising their rules
accordingly.
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1986
90. Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 1988
91. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure - Under Rule 11, attorneys (and pro se
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(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b) (emphasis added). Courts may impose sanctions-- including monetary
sanctions--"upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties that have violated subdivision (b) or are
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resulting in "heightened" protection for the other party. In these relationships the law establishes
a duty of full disclosure, utmost good faith, and fair dealing.” (Citing W. Page Keeton et Al.,
Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 106, at 738 (5th ed. 1984)
93 Section 2-503 of the Uniform Probate Code now provides a dispensing power in the courts to
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94. See infra note 67
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